CHAPTER 29

THE RIGHTS TO CONFRONT AND PRESENT EVIDENCE

§ 29.01 Scope of the Right

§ 29.02 Confrontation

§ 29.03 - Face-to-Face With the Jury

§ 29.04 - Face-to-Face With the Accused

§ 29.05 - Cross-Examined

§ 29.06 - Hearsay Exceptions as Confrontation Clause Exceptions

§ 29.07 The Right To Present Evidence

§ 29.08 Presenting and Confronting Privileged Evidence

§ 29.01

Scope of the Right

The state and federal constitutions grant the complementary rights to confront adverse evidence, and to present favorable evidence.{1} The Vermont Supreme Court sometimes says that article 10's confrontation right is no different from the sixth amendment's,{2} but these dicta cannot be taken as legislatively locking article 10 to the sixth amendment for all purposes. That said, however, it must be acknowledged that the Vermont court's confrontation and compulsory process case law under the sixth amendment and article 10 have so far been almost identical.

§ 29.02

Confrontation

The right to confrontation presumes sworn testimony in the jury's presence, face-to-face with the accused, and subject to cross-examination.{3} None of these is an absolute,{4} and the limitations are discussed below. In addition, the confrontation clause does not bar evidence that falls within established hearsay exceptions.

Both the sixth amendment right and, so far as the case law has developed, its article 10 counterpart, are exclusively trial rights, and do not protect a defendant's right of access to adverse testimony before trial.{5}

§ 29.03

- Face-to-Face With the Jury

The confrontation clauses establish a constitutional preference for live testimony in the presence of a jury, on the ground that "when the witness is compelled to stand face to face with the jury, `they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.'"{6}

Two exceptions to the hearsay rule permit introduction of a witness's testimony outside the jury's presence.

A witness's sworn, cross-examined testimony in another setting (e.g., a deposition or pre-trial hearing) can be admitted under V.R.E. 804 in lieu of live testimony at trial,{7} so long as the witness is "unavailable,"{8} a term which requires a showing of diligent good faith efforts to secure the witness's presence.{9} Unavailability means more than inconvenience, and more is required to show diligent efforts than a phone call and a letter.{10} An out-of-state witness is not unavailable if the state knows where the witness can be found but fails to subpoena him or her.{11}

Unavailability need not entail physical absence, because the "critical factor is the unavailability of [the witness's] live testimony[,]" and a witness who has given cross-examined testimony in the past, but who cannot or refuses to testify at the trial, can be deemed unavailable for sixth amendment purposes.{12}

To be admissible the witness's recorded testimony must have been sufficiently "confronted," which means that the declarant testified under oath, the defendant was represented by counsel, the testimony was subject to crossexamination, and the proceedings were before a judicial tribunal and recorded.{13} In addition, the defendant must have had at least the opportunity to be personally present.{14}

The defense must also have had a sufficient opportunity and motive to crossexamine the prior testimony.{15} In State v. Sprague, where the deposition of a key prosecution witness was adjourned midway through cross-examination and the witness then refused to testify further, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the defendant had not been given an adequate opportunity to cross-examine.{16} In the same case the court held that the witness's testimony at a suppression hearing could be admitted, reasoning that the defendant's opportunity and motive for cross-examination at the hearing were essentially no different from what they would have been at trial.{17}

V.R.E. 807, which authorizes videotaped testimony of witnesses aged twelve or under in sex offense cases, carves out a similar exception on a showing of something less than unavailability as defined by Rule 804.{18}

§ 29.04

- Face-to-Face With the Accused

Confrontation also normally means testimony face-to-face with the accused, because "it is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person `to his face' than `behind his back.'"{19}

The right to face-to-face confrontation, the United States Supreme Court held in Coy v. Iowa, can be denied only on a particularized showing of need.{20} In State v. Dunbar{21} the Vermont Supreme Court approved seating arrangements in a child sexual abuse case which partly obstructed the child complainant's view of the defendant, on a record that "suggested" that the witness "would be unable to testify without some accommodation[,]" a standard that is similar to V.R.E. 807's standard for videotaped testimony.

When testimony is taken out of court (depositions or videotaped testimony pursuant to Rule 807), the judge can impose the same sort of restrictive seating arrangements.{22}

§ 29.05

- Cross-Examined

Most importantly, the confrontation clause guarantees the right of cross-examination: "[t]he crux of a confrontation clause violation is the lack of an effective opportunity to cross-examine the person whose statement is being used against the defendant."{23}

Cross-examination of a nonparty witness can cover "the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. . . ."{24} The defendant must have the opportunity for an "effective" cross-examination,{25} and "wide latitude should be allowed . . . for the purpose of showing who and what the witness is, and that he is unreliable, prejudiced, or biased."{26} The defendant should have "an opportunity . . . of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness";{27} when the witness is an expert the defendant "has the right to explore . . . not only the basis and content of the expert's opinion, but also the professional qualifications of the person rendering it."{28} But the opportunity need not be productive: a witness's loss of memory which effectively prevents cross-examination on a key point does not deny the defendant his rights under the sixth amendment confrontation clause.{29}

In general, cross-examination should follow immediately after direct.

The judge's overall ability to supervise introduction of evidence,{30} and to exclude evidence which he deems more prejudicial than probative,{31} includes discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination, and the Vermont Supreme Court has said it will not second guess such restrictions without a clear showing of abuse.{32}

Vermont's rape shield law,{33} which places special restrictions on crossexamination of complaining witnesses in sexual assault cases,{34} is discussed in other sections.{35}

§ 29.06

- Hearsay Exceptions as Confrontation Clause Exceptions

The hearsay rules and the confrontation clauses "are designed to protect similar values" although "the congruence is not exact, and a statement which might be admissible under the rules must still be subject to a more rigorous constitutional scrutiny."{36} Just as not all hearsay violations are also confrontation clause violations,{37} not all hearsay exceptions are also confrontation clause exceptions. An objection to evidence on hearsay grounds will not necessarily preserve a confrontation clause objection.{38}

In particular, to qualify for admission under the confrontation clause, out-of-court statements must have "sufficient `indicia of reliability' to show their trustworthiness."{39} Reliability may be inferred in the case of a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception,{40} but a statement that the rules admit on the basis of a legal fiction, or not technically on the basis of a hearsay "exception," does not qualify for this sort of presumptive reliability.{41} In State v. Tedesco{42} the Vermont Supreme Court held that the out-of-court statement of an alleged accomplice, admissible under V.R.E. 801(D)(2)(E) as a statement by a co-conspirator during the course of a conspiracy, was nevertheless inadmissible under the confrontation clause. The statement was neither "per se" trustworthy, nor shown to be trustworthy in the circumstances.{43} Similarly, testimony offered under new (and not "firmly rooted") hearsay exceptions, such as a provision allowing out-of-court statements by child victims, cannot be presumed trustworthy for sixth amendment purposes,{44} and the proponent must make a particularized showing of trustworthiness.{45}

When a particularized showing is required, the relevant facts are those that surround the making of the statement; the proponent cannot rely on evidence having nothing to do with the statement but which tends to corroborate it.{46}

If constitutional reliability is shown, the sixth amendment does not generally require the prosecution to show that the out-of-court declarant is "unavailable." Language in earlier cases which seemed to impose that requirement{47} has now been limited to the special case of prior recorded testimony, discussed in § 29.03 above,{48} and the United States Supreme Court has not required a showing of unavailability for hearsay statements of co-conspirators,{49} or for statements admissible under the "spontaneous declaration" and "medical examination" exceptions to the hearsay rule.{50} The Vermont Supreme Court has similarly rejected a confrontation clause challenge to the hearsay testimony of a child complainant, although it has not gone so far as the United States Supreme Court in dispensing with the need to show unavailability.{51}

Even so, when the witness is not unavailable to testify, the sixth amendment may still require something more than circumstantial or presumptive reliability. The United States Supreme Court's recent cases have upheld admission of out-of-court statements on the ground that the statements may have probative value which in-court cross-examined testimony would lack, and that requiring in-court testimony would add little. For example, a co-conspirator's contemporaneous statements "provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the same matters in court."{52} The court reached similar conclusions with regard to "spontaneous declaration" and "medical examination" hearsay.{53} It is not clear whether these findings of special reliability are essential to admissibility.

§ 29.07

The Right To Present Evidence

Like the confrontation right, the right to present favorable evidence is simultaneously a basic safeguard and an area that is pervasively regulated by statutes, rules, and the judge's discretion. The defendant's state constitutional right "to call for evidence in his favor" does not imply a right to introduce irrelevant or "unduly prejudicial or misleading evidence[,]"{54} matters that are usually governed by rules of evidence.{55} On the other hand, rules of evidence and other nonconstitutional law cannot define the outer limits of the constitutional right to present evidence any more than they define the right to confront, although the Vermont Supreme Court has been guilty of dicta to that effect.{56} Evidentiary restrictions that prevent introduction of relevant exculpatory evidence can violate the sixth amendment right to present a defense,{57} although such violations will be found only rarely. In State v. Percy the Vermont court held that the exclusion of a defense expert, proper in the trial court's discretion under V.R.E. 702 on the ground that it would not have aided the jury, was also not a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to present favorable evidence.{58}

Whatever else they do not guarantee, the sixth amendment and article 10 both ensure the right of the defendant to testify in his or her own defense,{59} and burdens on that right have been held unconstitutional.{60} In State v. Begins{61} the Vermont Supreme Court held that a defendant's need to testify in defense of probation revocation charges required a grant of use immunity to protect her from self-incrimination in a subsequent criminal trial.{62}

Of course, the right to introduce favorable evidence does not excuse the defense from complying with normal procedural prerequisites. Evidence that is offered too late can be excluded on the judge's general authority to control the order of proof.{63} Similarly, the failure of the defense to comply with discovery rules or with the notice requirements for alibi and insanity defense cases may result in preclusion of favorable evidence.{64} But before ordering such a drastic sanction the trial judge should "weigh the defendant's right to offer testimony of favorable witnesses against `the integrity of the adversary process . . . , the interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process. . . .'"{65} Relevant factors include the willfulness and flagrancy of the violation and the importance of the evidence to the defense.{66} It is arguable under chapter I, article 10 (but not under the sixth amendment) that witness preclusion is a proper sanction only if the defendant was personally complicit in the rule violation.{67}

§ 29.08

Presenting and Confronting Privileged Evidence

In Davis v. Alaska{68} the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant had a confrontation clause right to impeach a witness with his juvenile records, notwithstanding that the records were protected by a state evidentiary privilege. This sixth amendment right to invade privilege is a trial right and does not guarantee the defense a right of access to privileged information;{69} the constitutional error in Davis "was not that [the state] made this information confidential; it was that the defendant was denied the right `to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'"{70}

Vermont's rape shield law{71} categorically excludes most evidence of the complaining witness's prior sexual conduct, allowing only certain types of such evidence, and only if the judge finds that its probative value outweighs its "private character."{72} In State v. Patnaude{73} the Vermont Supreme Court rejected a claim that these restrictions infringed the rights to confront and present evidence, on the ground that the excluded evidence lacked any probative value, and indeed that it was "worse than worthless."{74} The shield law can operate to exclude material evidence, however. In a sexual assault case where consent was the defense,{75} the Vermont Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in excluding the complainant's prior sexual relationship with the defendant, because "[c]onsensual sexual activity over a period of years, coupled with a claimed consensual act reasonably contemporaneous with the act complained of, is clearly material on the issue of consent[,]" and its probative value outweighed its private character.{76} In other cases the court, while acknowledging that the excluded proof may have had some probative value, reached the same conclusion it reached in Patnaude, holding that the shield law did not restrict the defendant's right to confront or present material evidence in a constitutionally impermissible way.{77}

1. The defendant has the sixth amendment rights "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" and "to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favour[,]" and the state constitutional right under chapter I, article 10 "to be heard by himself and his counsel; . . . to be confronted with the witnesses; [and] to call for evidence in his favor. . . ."

2. State v. Roberts, 154 Vt. 59, 66 n.3 (1990); State v. Sprague, 144 Vt. 385, 390 n.2 (1984).

3. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); State v. Roberts, 154 Vt. 59, 66 (1990) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987)).

4. State v. Roberts, 154 Vt. 59, 66 (1990).

5. State v. Percy, 149 Vt. 623, 633 (1988) (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987)).

6. State v. Carroll, 147 Vt. 108, 112 (1986) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980)). See State v. Towne, 142 Vt. 241, 247 (1982) (quoting the same language).

7. Admission of depositions in lieu of live testimony is governed by the similar provisions of V.R.Cr.P. 15(h)-(j).

8. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722 (1968); State v. Roberts, 154 Vt. 59, 66 (1990); State v. Sprague, 144 Vt. 385, 391 (1984). The term includes witnesses who are exempted from testifying on grounds of privilege, who refuse to testify despite an order to do so, who testify to a lack of memory, who are physically unable to attend because of death or physical or mental illness, and who are absent from the hearing and who cannot be produced "by process or other reasonable means." V.R.Cr.P. 15(j); V.R.E. 804(a).

9. State v. Lynds, No. 88-597, slip op. 2-3 (Vt. Oct. 25, 1991); State v. Carroll, 147 Vt. 108, 112 (1986) (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968), and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 79 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).

10. State v. Lynds, No. 88-597, slip op. 3-4 (Vt. Oct. 25, 1991). If a witness is truly unavailable at the time of a scheduled trial the state may be required to seek a brief continuance. Id. at 4.

11. State v. Carroll, 147 Vt. 108, 113 (1986). See also State v. Lynds, No. 88-597 (Vt. Oct. 25, 1991).

12. V.R.E. 804(a)(1)-(2); V.R.Cr.P. 15(j); State v. Roberts, 154 Vt. 59, 66-67 (1990); State v. Sprague, 144 Vt. 385 (1984) (refusal to testify).

13. State v. Sprague, 144 Vt. 385, 391 (1984) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970)).

14. This is a specific rule requirement in the case of depositions. V.R.Cr.P. 15(h).

15. V.R.E. 804(b)(1); United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503 (1992); State v. Sprague, 144 Vt. 385, 388 (1984). The opportunity must be "full, substantial and meaningful in view of the realities of the situation," but if the opportunity was offered it need not have been taken advantage of. Sprague at 388-89 (quoting United States v. Franklin, 235 F. Supp. 338, 341 (D.D.C. 1964)).

16. State v. Sprague, 144 Vt. 385, 389-90 (1984).

17. State v. Sprague, 144 Vt. 385, 391-92 (1984). Compare United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503 (1992) (remanding for determination whether government had similar motives in grand jury examination and at trial).

18. The rule is discussed in § 31.23.

19. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019, (1988).

20. Gy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988). See also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 851-52 (1990).

21. 152 Vt. 399, 404-06 (1989).

22. See V.R.E. 807(f) (defendant has right to be present at videotaping unless judge finds substantial risk of trauma "in which case the court may order that the defendant be situated in such a way that the child cannot hear or see the defendant").

23. State v. Tedesco, 147 Vt. 133, 136 (1986) (quoting State v. Paquette, 146 Vt. 1, 4-5 (1985)).

24. V.R.E. 611(b); State v. Kasper, 137 Vt. 184, 200-01 (1979).

25. State v. Carter, 156 Vt. 437, 445 (1991).

26. State v. Kasper, 137 Vt. 184, 201 (1979) (quoting State v. Berard, 132 Vt. 138, 147 (1974)).

27. State v. Towne, 142 Vt. 241, 247 (1982) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 Vt. 237, 242-43 (1895)).

28. State v. Towne, 142 Vt. 243, 247-48 (1982).

29. State v. Carter, 156 Vt. 437, 445 (1991) (citing Delaware v. Fensterrer, 474 U.S. 15, 19 (1985)); State v. Larose, 150 Vt. 363, 369-70 (1988); State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. 366, 378 (1987).

30. V.R.E.611(a); State v. Venman, 151 Vt. 561, 570-71 (1989).

31. V.R.E. 403. See § 31.02, 31.07.

32. State v. Carter, 156 Vt. 437, 443-48 (1991) (particulars of immunity agreement could be excluded where jury knew of state's lenient treatment and details would not have significantly added to existing proof of bias); State v. Valley, 153 Vt. 380, 393 (1989); State v. Larose, 150 Vt. 363, 370 (1988); State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. 366, 378 (1987); State v. Peters, 147 Vt. 390, 392 (1986) (irrelevant line of questioning); State v. Brown, 147 Vt. 324, 328 (1986); State v. Smith, 145 Vt. 121, 135 (1984) (questioning concerning oath was cumulative); State v. Berard, 132 Vt. 138, 148, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974) (cumulative questioning).

33. 13 V.S.A. § 3255.

34. The section applies only to "a crime defined in this chapter[,]" i.e., ch. 72 of title 13, and not sex offenses in other chapters, such as the lewd offense provisions defined in ch. 59 of title 13.

35. See §§ 29.08, 31.21, infra.

36. State v. Carroll, 147 Vt. 108, 111 (1986).

37. See State v. Towne, 142 Vt. 241 (1982) (expert witness's testimony about views of a second expert was both a hearsay and a confrontation clause violation).

38. Watker v. Parole Board, 157 Vt. 72, 78-79 (1991).

39. State v. Tedesco, 147 Vt. 133, 137 (1986) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980)).

40. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-84 (1987); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); State v. Tedesco, 147 Vt. 133, 137 (1986).

41. State v. Tedesco, 147 Vt. 133, 137 (1986) (co-conspirator statements defined as nonhearsay, not as hearsay exception), 138 (admissibility of co-conspirator statements rests on legal fiction which does not always assure reliability).

42. 147 Vt. 133 (1986).

43. State v. Tedesco, 147 Vt. 133, 137-39 (1986). Compare United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (rejecting a confrontation clause objection to admission of co-conspirator hearsay).

44. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1990).

45. In State v. Gallagher, 150 Vt. 341, 347-48 (1988), the Vermont Supreme Court held that the out-of-court statement of a child complainant in a sexual assault prosecution was sufficiently reliable for sixth amendment purposes.

46. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819-21 (1990).

47. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980); State v. Tedesco, 147 Vt. 133, 137 (1986).

48. See White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 741 (1992).

49. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394-400 (1986).

50. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).

51. State v. Gallagher, 150 Vt. 341, 344-47, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 995 (1988).

52. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742 (1992) (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986)).

53. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 742-43 (1992).

54. State v. Johnson, 143 Vt. 355, 359 (1983).

55. See V.R.E. 401-03; § 31.02, infra.

56. See State v. Potter, 148 Vt. 53, 59 (1987) (article 10 "does not confer upon the criminal defendant an independent right to introduce evidence at the trial; the `evidence in his favor' must conform to the law of evidence in order to be admissible"). The defendant does have a burden to persuade the court why it should find a constitutional violation for exclusion of evidence made inadmissible by the rules. State v. Larose, 150 Vt. 363, 370-71 (1988).

57. See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1972) (unconstitutional to exclude witness's repudiated confession on state hearsay grounds).

58. State v. Percy, 156 Vt. 468, 475-77 (1991). The expert would have testified to the effects of stress and other factors on the reliability of an eyewitness identification, in a prosecution where eyewitness identification was a key element of the prosecution. The court wrote that in some cases "it may be error not to allow the defendant to introduce `qualified expert testimony on specific psychological factors shown by the record that could have affected the accuracy of the identification but are not likely to be fully known to or understood by the jury.'" Id. at 475 (quoting People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1984)).

59. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); State v. Brunelle, 148 Vt. 347, 351-52 (1987).

60. In Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the state could not compel the defendant to testify first in the defense case.

61. 147 Vt. 295 (1986).

62. Begins and related cases are discussed in § 30.04, infra.

63. State v. Potter, 148 Vt. 53, 58-59 (1987).

64. See, e.g., V.R.Cr.P. 12.1(e) (on failure to comply with notice of defense requirement "court, except for good cause shown, shall exclude the testimony of any witness offered by such party as to the issue in question"); 16.2(g)(1); Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. 1743 (1991) (preclusion was not per se due process violation); State v. Edwards, 153 Vt. 649 (1989) (general discretion to sanction discovery violations includes preclusion of witnesses). See § 24.17, supra (witness preclusion as a discovery sanction).

65. State v. Edwards, 153 Vt. 649 (1989) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414-15 (1988)).

66. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415 (1988).

67. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 436 (1988) (dissenting opinion). The dissenters make the telling point "that witness preclusion operates as an effective deterrent only to the extent that it has a possible effect on the outcome of the trial. Indeed, it employs in part the possibility that a distorted record will cause a jury to convict a defendant of a crime he did not commit." Id. at 431.

68. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).

69. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987); State v. Percy, 149 Vt. 623, 633 (1988). These cases do recognize a qualified due process right to discovery of privileged material. See § 24.21, supra.

70. State v. Percy, 149 Vt. 623, 633 (1988) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 54 (1987), and Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)).

71. 13 V.S.A. § 3255(a) excludes all opinion and reputation evidence of the complaining witness's sexual conduct, and (with certain exceptions) all evidence of his or her prior sexual conduct.

72. 13 V.S.A. § 3255(a)(3). See § 31.21, infra.

73. 140 Vt. 361 (1981).

74. State v. Patnaude, 140 Vt. 361, 380 (1981).

75. State v. Gonyaw, 146 Vt. 559 (1986).

76. State v. Gonyaw, 146 Vt. 559, 563 (1986).

77. See State v. Lavalette, 154 Vt. 426, 428 (1990) (prior consensual sexual relationship with defendant ceased 18 months before assault); State v. Ross, 152 Vt. 462, 470-71 (1989) (prior false allegations excluded on insufficient showing of falsity); State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. 366, 377-79 (1987) (prior conduct, offered to show source "disease," i.e., child complainant's posttraumatic stress disorder).